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The Abu Ghraib Story
Jeffrey F. Addicott*

The purpose of this Article is to examine the facts associated with the prison
abuse at Abu Ghraib and to discuss the applicable legal and policy lessons
learned as a result of the scandal. Was the prison abuse a reflection of a
systemic policy-either de jure or de facto-on the part of the United States
to illegally extract information from detainees or was the abuse simply
isolated acts of criminal behavior on the part of a handful of soldiers
amplified by an incompetent tactical chain of command at the prisonfacility?

* Professor of Law, Director, Center for Terrorism Law, and Associate Dean of
Administration, St. Mary's University School of Law, B.A. (with honors), University
of Maryland; J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., The Judge
Advocate General's School of Law; LL.M. and S.J.D.; University of Virginia School
of Law. This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Center for Terrorism
Law located at St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. The goal
of the Center is to examine both current and potential legal issues attendant to
terrorism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I failed to identify the catastrophicdamage that the allegations of
abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to the safety of our
troops in the field, to the cause to which we are committed.
Donald Rumsfeld

There is no such thing as a "clean" war. As the War on Terror
continues into its third year, 2 America has suffered a significant
number of tactical errors in the use of its military ranging from
friendly fire incidents that have killed American soldiers 3 and the

soldiers of its coalition partners, 4 to the unintended deaths of noncombatants by coalition military fire power. 5 While these tragedies

1See Johanna McGeary, The Scandal's Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004, at
28 (cluoting Rumsfeld's remarks to Congress).
See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR: LEGAL
AND POLICY LESSONS FROM THE PAST 20-32 (2003) (describing the use of the term

"war on terror" and the pronouncements of the executive, legislative, and judicial
bodies of government concerning the use of force as well as the nature and structure
of the al-Qa'eda virtual State) [hereinafter WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR]; See, e.g.,
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Public Law 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (Congressional authorization for the use of force against the Taliban
regime); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (Congressional authorization for the use of force
against Iraq); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 17 L.Ed. 459 (1862) (rejecting a
challenge to President Lincoln's authority to blockade secessionist Southern States
without a Congressional declaration of war).
See Josh White, Tillman Killed By 'Friendly Fire',; Probe Cites ErrorPlatoon
Mates, WASH. POST, May 30, 2004, at Al.
4 See Jonathan Weisman, Rumsfeld Admits Allies Were Killed, USA TODAY,
Feb. 22, 2002, at A4 (discussing deaths of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in friendly
fire incidents).
5 See Barry Bearak, Eric Schmitt, & Craig S. Smith, Unknown Toll in the Fog
of War. Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al
(discussing the issue of collateral damage to civilians and civilian property caused by
U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan. The average estimate ranges between 1,000 to 1,300
civilian deaths); see also Matthew Schofield, Nancy A. Youssef, & Juan 0. Tamayo,
Civilian Death Toll in Battle For Baghdad At Least 1,100, May 4, 2003,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, at All (reporting at least 1,100 Iraqi civilian dead and
6,800 wounded as of May 2003).
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have been leveraged by some to criticize the legitimacy of the
American led effort to employ force against its enemies on the
battlefield, 6 all such attempts to denigrate the war polices and
credibility of the United States pale in the wake of the prisoner abuse
scandal at Abu Ghraib. 7 Not only did the photographs of American8
soldiers abusing Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq

create a firestorm of allegations concerning illegal interrogation
'0

practices, 9 but it provided terrorist groups a "propaganda bonanza"'
that threatened to derail fundamental legal1 and policy pillars upon
which America conducts the War on Terror.
Now that all of the individuals directly responsible for the actual
abuse have been prosecuted, the purpose of this Article is to examine
the facts associated with the prison abuse at Abu Ghraib and to discuss
the applicable legal and policy lessons learned as a result of the
scandal. Was the prison abuse a reflection of a systemic policyeither dejure or defacto-on the part of the United States to illegally
6 See,

e.g., Philip G. Zimbardo, Power Turns Good Soldiers into 'Bad Apples,'

BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2004, at D 11. "It is time for all Americans to reflect on the
justification for continuing the war in Iraq that is killing, maiming, and demeaning
our young men and women who have been put in harm's way for spurious reasons."
Id.
7 See infra Part III.
8 For an excellent chronological overview see Dave Moniz, Timeline, USA
TODAY, Aug. 26, 2004, at A4 [hereinafter Timeline].
9 See, e.g., Runsfeld Vindication, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2004, at A12 (listing a
variety of politicians and others who allege that the Pentagon was sanctioning war
crimes and quoting Mr. James Schlesinger who criticized Senator Ted Kennedy for
alleging that the Abu Ghraib photos demonstrated that the U.S. was using torture to
get information) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Vindication].
1o See MSNBC interview of Jeffrey Addicott by Chris Jansing, May 23, 2004
(Addicott argued that the Abu Ghraib abuse story was a propaganda bonanza for the
terrorists and a political pifiata for those opposed to the Bush administration's
handling of the war in Iraq).
1 Michael Rubin, Mistakes Musn 't Halt March, BALTIMORE SUN, May 7, 2004,
at A 19 (quoting Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, "the incident was proof
that the United States had a "systematic plan to torture Iraqis, to kill them, to rape
them"); David S. Cloud & Farnaz Fassihi, Red Cross Told Powell of Abuse Of Iraqi
Prisoners in January, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004, at A2 (stating Mr. Jakob
Kellenberger, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
warned about "systematic and excessive" abuses of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. guards
long before the Abu Ghraib story broke).
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extract information from detainees or was the abuse simply isolated
acts of criminal behavior on the part of a handful of soldiers amplified
by an incompetent tactical chain of command at the prison facility?

II. THE IRAQ WAR AND

THE STATUS OF THE DETAINEES

We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants today is the record on which history will judge us
tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to
our own lips as well. 12
Robert Jackson, Chief US Prosecutor at Nuremberg
The Iraqi War' 3 began on March 19, 2003,14 with a coordinated
air attack by coalition forces against Iraqi military targets in Baghdad.
Forming a "coalition of the willing" made up of like minded
democracies, 5 President Bush acted under his Article II authority as
the Commander in Chief 16 and a Congressional use of force resolution7
passed by an unprecedented majority of both houses of the Congress. '
12 See Thomas B. Wilner, Law-Free Zone, WALL ST. J.,

May 13, 2004, at A12

(recognizing that even the most notorious of war criminals are entitled to due process
of law).
13 The campaign is also known as "Operation Iraqi Freedom" see Rebecca
Blumenstein & Matthew Rose, Name That Op: How U.S. Coins Phrases of War,

WALL ST. J., March 24, 2003, at B I.
14 Seeds of the Showdown, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), April 20, 2004,
at
3.
IS For
an up to date list of coalition partners, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov /infocus/iraq/news/20030327-I0.html (released 27-3-03)
(last visited May 22, 2006) (declaring 49 member nations are publicly committed to
the coalition). See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Core Principlesfor a Free Iraq, WALL ST.
J., May 27, 2004, at A14 (stating as of May 2004, 39 nations have offered
stabilization forces or other needed assistance with Operation Iraqi Freedom).
16 U.S. Constitution Article II, § 2, cl. 1. Authority derived from Article II of the
Constitution provides that the President "shall be the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States."
17 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. Congress specifically found that Iraq supported
international terrorist groups and was in development of weapons of mass
destruction.
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Although the war occurred without specific approval 18 for the "use of
force"'19 from the United Nations Security Council,2 ° the Security
Council did pass Resolution 144121 just prior to the Iraqi War which
warned Saddam Hussein's regime of "serious consequences" ' 22 if Iraq
failed to comply with full inspections by United Nations personnel
regarding the regime's suspected possession of illegal biological and
chemical weapons in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
687.23

Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on
terrorism and Iraq's ongoing supportfor internationalterroristgroups
combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in

direct violation of it obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other
United Naitons Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the
national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the
war on terrorism ... (emphasis added J.A.). Id.
'8 Peter S. Canellos, & Anne E. Kornblut, Law Specialists Heartened By US
Move to Justify Force, BOSTON GLOBE, March, 19, 2003, at A17.
19 The last time that the employment of armed force was specifically authorized
by the Security Council was to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf
War; see S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 4 5 th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990). Resolution 678 reads in relevant part:
The Security Council ...
2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991 fully implements ...
the foregoing Resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent
relevant Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in
the area ....
20 See JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE 76-78 (2005) (arguing

that the actions of the United States were justified as self defense under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter because the thousands of hostile actions by Saddam Hussein against
coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones established by the U.N. Security Council
following the 1991 Gulf War served as the "functional equivalent of an ongoing
war").

21S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR,
(2002).

5 7 th

Sess.,

4 6 4 4 th

mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441

22 id.

21 S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 46 th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
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In three months the Iraqi military was defeated in toto.
Interestingly although the U.N. did not pass a use of force resolution,
the United Nations Security Council voted unanonomously (14-0) in
May of 2003 to grant the United States and the United Kingdom
effective legal control over all aspects of the Iraqi economy and
political process pending the creation of an internationally recognized
24
Similarly, in June 2004, the Security Council
interim government.
again voted unanimously (14-0) to fully recognize the legitimacy of
new interim Iraqi government which took power on June 28, 2004.25
While the end to major combat operations was declared by
26
President Bush on May 1, 2003, a new and deadly chapter in the
Iraqi War quickly took hold-coalition forces and Iraqi civilians were
now targeted for murder by various groups of guerrilla fighters,
common criminals, and terrorists. 27 Even the capture of the dictator,
Saddam Hussein 28 on December 15, 2003 29 did not stem the growing
volume of terrorist attacks.
The continued fighting and terrorist attacks in Iraq required the
United States to alter its occupation/exit strategy. Instead of reducing
the number of troops on the ground in Iraq as was hoped for in the
occupation phase of the campaign, the United States was obliged to
keep about 150,000 military personnel and perhaps as many as
100,000 civilian contractors in Iraqi (as of 2006, these numbers remain
fairly accurate). Clearly, the United States had underestimated the
24

S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR,

5 8 th

Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483

(2003).

25 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 5 9th Sess., 4 9 8 7

h

mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1546

(2004).

26 Dana Milbank & Bradley Graham, Bush Revises Views On 'Combat' in Iraq;
'MajorOperations'Over, PresidentSays, WASH POST, Aug. 19, 2003, at Al 5.
27 See WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the term

terrorist has no universal meaning but should be viewed as the use of illegal violence
against civilian targets to instill a climate of fear).
28 See MOORE, supra note 20, at 73 (arguing that Saddam Hussein's regime
was
a brutal totalitarian regime with an undisputed record of wholesale violations of
human rights to include the murder of his own people and the instigation of
aggression against other nations to include Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel,
Britain, and the United States).
29 David R. Guarino, Saddam Captured; US Finds Ace in Hole,
BOSTON
HERALD, Dec. 15, 2003, at 2.
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presence of foreign and host nation terrorists, Iraqi Republican guard
fighters, "and on down the list." 30 In turn, because of the associated
strain on its active duty military forces, the United States was forced to

utilize a large number of its military reserve personnel to maintain
proper troop strength.
The rising intensity of the insurgency in mid 2003 also mandated
that the large number of detainees that were being apprehended had to
be categorized and housed. Accordingly, the United States grouped
the detainees into one of three categories: (1) Iraqi soldiers who
3
qualified as prisoners of war (POW) under the Geneva Conventions; 1
(2) those suspected of having links to a variety of terrorist groups (to
include Saddam loyalists and radical Islamic fundamentalists), called
"security detainees;, 32 and (3) common criminals.
Those in the first category were mostly captured in the wake of the

major combat phase of the Iraqi War and were quickly processed and
30 See Patrick J. McDonnell, 500 Iraqi Detainees to be Freed, Coalition Will

Release Nonviolent PrisonersNot Considered Threats. Bounties will be Offered for
Information on Key Guerrilla Suspects, LA TIMES, Jan, 7, 2004, at A4 (reporting
despite capture of Saddam Hussein attacks against coalition forces in Iraq have
remained steady).
31The current corpus of the law of war consists of all of those laws, by treaty and
customary principles that are applicable to warfare. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
serve as the primary source for the law of war and cover four categories. All four of
the Geneva Conventions come into effect in the event of an international armed
conflict regardless of how that conflict is characterized by domestic law: (I) Geneva
Convention of August 12, 1949, for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; (II Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (III) Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949,
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; and (IV) Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the
Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
32 Ian Fisher, Six Claim They're Americans, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss NEWS, Sept.
17, 2003, at A5 (indicating that as of September 2003 that many as 4,400 people are
being held as "security detainees"); but see John Hendren, Pentagon Labels Hussein
a POW, ConferringHim Special Rights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at Al (pointing
out that Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003, but was not
designated as a prisoner of war until January 9, 2004).
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released back into Iraqi society within a few months. 33 While most of
the prisoners were treated in accordance with the protections of the
Geneva Conventions, 34 the U.S. military reported numerous incidents
of physical abuse by American guards. 35 The most common type of
abuse seemed to occur at or near the point of capture and included
physical assaults and petty larceny. 36 In general terms, however, the
vast majority of POWs were treated in accordance with international
law protections. Most importantly, as prisoners of war these particular
class of detainees were not required to give any further information
upon additional questioning by American forces. 37 To ensure that all
parties to the conflict understood this fact, Article 17 of the Geneva
Conventions 38 provides the following:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners
of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous
treatment of any kind (emphasis added
39
J.A.).

33 John Hendren, After The War/ReestablishingOrder.- Sorting IraqiPOWs U.S.
Says it Plans to Hold Some of the 7,000 Remaining Prisonersfor Many Months, Los
ANGELES TIMES, April 19, 2003 at A6 (reporting 887 Iraqi POW's were released by
mid April 2003, almost a month from the March 1 9 th initiation of Operation Iraqi
Freedom ).
34 The basic goal of the law of war is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of
war by: "(1) protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary

suffering; (2) safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into
the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and
civilians; and (3) facilitating the restoration of peace." See FM 27-10, infra note 164, at
para. 2.

35 See Jane McHugh, Disgracedand Out, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at 1, 14
(describing the judicial punishment of four military police officers of the 320th
Military Police Battalion for abusing detainees at Camp Bucca in southern Iraq). Id.
36 Id.

37 Id. ("Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give
only his.

38 Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, supra note 31.
39 Id.
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Those in the second category were held for indefinite periods of
time pending interrogation and eventual transfer to the nascent Iraqi
judicial system. The reason that these security detainees were not
given the protections of the Third Geneva Convention is because they
failed to qualify as lawful enemy combatants. 40 In short, prisoner of
war status is conferred only on those persons who are "[m]embers of
armed forces of a Party to the conflict ' '4' or members of militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized
resistance movements, belonging to a Party ...provided that such ...
fulfill[s] ' ' 42 four specific conditions:
i) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
ii) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
iii) That of carrying arms openly; and
iv) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the
43
laws and customs of war.
Accordingly, unless a detainee in the post major combat phase of
the Iraqi War met these requirements he was not entitled to the status
of prisoner of war but was rather a security detainee. At most such an
individual would be protected only by the Fourth Geneva Convention
covering civilians held during the occupation 44 and the humanitarian
protections provided by common Article 3 of the Geneva

40

The Bush administration early on determined that al-Qa'eda and Taliban

fighters were not covered by the Geneva Conventions. The al-Qa'eda are not
covered because they were not combatants on behalf of a State that is a party to the
Geneva Conventions and the Taliban are not covered because they did not wear
uniforms that distinguished them from the civilian population. See Winning the War
on Terror, supra note 2, at 62-64.
41Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, supra note 31, at Article 4 A.
42 Id. at Article 4 A 2.
43

id.
44 Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Protections of

Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 31.
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Conventions.45 Common Article 3 protects all unlawful combatants
taken captive from "(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment ....
,,46

Essentially, the detainee must be

treated humanely, but can be questioned to gain information.
Those in the last category consisted of common felons who were
held until such time as the reformed Iraqi judicial system could
accommodate them. Although determinations were often hard to make
between a security detainee and a common criminal, the Bush
administration repeatedly made it clear that all detainees were to be
treated in accordance with the humanitarian concerns set out in the
Geneva Conventions. 47 Accordingly, all detention facilities received
regular visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Red
Cross).48 In fact, the Red Cross served a valuable function in Iraq by
alerting the United States to a number of abuse allegations.49 The Red
Cross had even provided U.S. officials with a report in November
2003 complaining of abusive practices at Abu Ghraib, to include
forcing prisoners to wear women's underwear and making prisoners
disrobe.50

The establishment of detention facilities to house the detainees
was aggravated by the sheer number of detainees. This required the
coalition to utilize prison structures that had been used in the Saddam
era to include the infamous prison at Abu Ghraib, located about 20
miles west of Baghdad. 5 ' Abu Ghraib was the largest U.S. run
45 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287, Common Article 3, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
46 id.

47 WINNING WAR ON TERROR, supra note 2, at 63.
48

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Hussein Gets Two Visitors from Red Cross, Feb 22,

2004, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN- SENTINEL, at Al (reporting Red Cross workers met with
more than 10,000 people in U.S. custody in Iraq between March and December
2003).
49 See, e.g., Farnaz Fassihi & Steve Stecklow, Behind Bars. Finding U.S. Abuse
in Iraq Left Red Cross Team in A Quandary, WALL ST.J., May 21, 2004 at Al.
50 Greg Jaffe & David S. Cloud, Officials in Iraq Knew Last Fall of Prison
Abuse, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2004 at Al (describing the Red Cross report of
improper conduct at Abu Ghraib and the military's reluctance to response).
51 See, e.g., note 48 and accompanying text.
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detention facility and, at a high point in the tempo of operations,
52
It is a vast complex
housed up to 7,000 detainees in October 2003.
of six separate compounds on a 280 acre site circled by over 2 miles of
fences and 24 guard towers. 53 The Red Cross reported that they made
regularly scheduled visits to a total of 14 U.S. run facilities 54 to
include the infamous Tier 1 (cellblock la), "a darkened, two-story
isolation wing used for interrogations" 55 and the cite of the prisoner
abuse, at Abu Ghraib. During the visit to Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib, they
reported that they did not notice anything "as bad as the abuses
thirty-five people where held in
portrayed in the ... photos.",56 About
57
Tier 1 during the Red Cross visit.

III. The Abuses at Abu Ghraib
I want to tell the people of the Middle East that the practices that
took place in that prison are abhorrent. And they58 don't represent
America. They represent the actions of afew people.
George W. Bush
The public was first shown the infamous photographs taken inside
of the U.S. military run prison at Abu Ghraib in a CBS show called 60
Minutes II aired on April 28, 2004. 5 ' The widely circulated photos
showed a handful of U.S. military police soldiers engaged in a variety
of abusive and sexually sadistic acts against mostly blindfolded Iraqi
detainees. Among other things, the photos showed naked prisoners
stacked in pyramids, connected by wires, on a dog leash, and

52

Schlesinger Report, infra note 78, at 11.

53 See Donna Leinwand, Chaotic Prison Always on the Brink, USA TODAY,

Aug. 26, 2004, at A4.
54 But see Schlesinger Report, infra note 78, at II (listing approximately 17 sites
in Iraq).
55 Fassihi & Stecklow, supra note 49.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58

President George W. Bush address to Arab TV originally aired May 5, 2004.

59 See Timeline, supra note 8.
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threatened by dogs.60 In addition, a handful of U.S. military police
charged 6in1 the abuse scandal had forced naked prisoners to simulate
sex acts.
The chronology of how the Abu Ghraib abuse story was revealed
began on January 13, 2004, when Army Specialist Joseph Darby, a
military policeman at Abu Ghraib, gave a computer disc containing the
abuse photos to a military investigator. 62 On January 14, 2004, the
Army immediately initiated a criminal investigation and the United
States Central Command (the four-star combatant command located in
Florida) informed the media in a press release on January 16, 2004,
that it was investigating detainee abuse at an unspecified U.S. prison in
Iraq. 63 On February 23, 2004, the military informed the U.S. press
that 17 Army personnel had been suspended of duty pending further
criminal investigations about the detainee abuse. 64 Then, on March
20, 2004, the military reported to the media that it had charged six
soldiers with detainee abuse to include criminal charges of assault,
cruelty, indecent acts, and mistreatment. 6 5 Interestingly, however, the
press did not fully respond to the growing story as the mere fact that
soldiers were going to be punished for misconduct did not constitute
news that was out of the ordinary-the military regularly punishes
soldiers who violate the law. In fact, the media only became
energized
66
photos.
the
aired
II
Minutes
60
on April 28, 2004, when
Pursuant to evidence of criminal misconduct contained in a U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Report, 67 nine enlisted
reserve soldiers, all from the 3 7 2 nd Military Police Company, 3 2 0 th
Military Police Battalion, 8 0 0 th Military Police Brigade from
60

61

Id.
See Nadia Abou El-Magd, Photos of Naked Iraqi Prisoners Outrage Arabs,

Bush Condemns the Conduct, Which is Expected to Fuel Anti-American Sentiment in
the Mideast. Six U.S. Soldiers to Face Charges, LA TIMES, May 2, 2004, at A8;
Kathy Kiely & William M. Welch, Abu Ghraib Photos Cause Gasps in Congress,

USA TODAY, May 13, 2004, at A4 (describing the disgust from members of
Congress who viewed other photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal).
62 See Timeline, supra note 8.
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Schlesinger Report, infra note 78, at 13.
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Cresaptown, Maryland, were charged with an assortment of violations
of provisions of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. 68 The central

figure in the scandal was reservist Private First Class (PFC) Lynndie
England, 69 who is known for poses in which "she pointed at the
70
genitals of a naked detainee while a cigarette dangled from her lips
and "holding a [dog] leash around a naked prisoner's neck.",7 1 By

September 2005 all nine had been convicted (seven of the accused
pled guilty) and sentenced by courts martial. Specialist Charles
Graner, the father of England's baby, received the harshest sentence,
ten years confinement. Others included, Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick
(sentenced to eight years), Sergeant Javal Davis, Specialist Jeremy
72
Sivits, Specialist Sabrina Harman, and Specialist Megan Armbuhl.
All of those charged were reservists and all worked the night shift at
Tier 1 in Abu Ghraib, where the abuses took place in the last months
of 2003. 73
The particulars relating to the Abu Ghraib abuse story are now
well settled thanks to the CID's criminal investigation and a number of

68

See Mike Williams, GI Given Maximum Sentence MP Gets One Year in

JOURNAL, May 20, 2004, at Al
(reporting the first trial held was that of PFC Sivits who plead guilty and sentenced
to one year in confinement and a dishonorable discharge from the Army); Abuse

Prisonfor Role in Iraqi Prison Abuse, THE ATLANTA

Plea Is Guilty; Soldier From Virginia Convicted Of Failing To Prevent
Mistreatment, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 2004, at A12 (reporting Staff

Sgt. Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick II pleaded guilty to eight counts and was sentenced to
eight years in prison on October 21, 2004, Spc. Megan Armbuhl pleaded guilty and
was demoted and docked a half-month's pay on November 2, 2004, and proceedings
have not been scheduled for the four remaining soldiers charged in the incident).
69 Laura Parker, Ex-comrade: England Tormented Iraqis, USA TODAY
August
31, 2004, at A 13.
70 Id.
7 id.
72 See generally Dave Moniz & Donna Leinwand, Report: Poor Planning Set
Context for Abuse, USA TODAY, August 25, 2004, at 8a (discussing the findings of
the Schlesinger Report released on August 24, 2004).
73 See Sig Christenson, Trial Looms for "Poster Child" of the Abu Ghraib
Prison Scandal, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, September 15, 2005, at 5a
(discussing the trial of England).
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collateral administrative investigations.74 In chronological order they
are: (1) the April 2004 Taguba Report, 75 prepared by Major General
76
Antonio Taguba; (2) the July 2004 Army Inspector General Report,
prepared under Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek; (3) the August
2004 Fay Report,77 prepared by Major General George Fay; and (4)
the August 2004 Schlesinger Report, 78 headed by the former Secretary
of Defense in the Nixon administration, James Schlesinger. In
addition, there are four other related examinations that have yet to be
completed as of this writing. They include: (1) Vice Admiral Albert
Church, Navy Inspector General, looking into interrogation and
detention rules in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; (2) Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, looking into all prisoner operations and
interrogation procedures; (3) CID investigation, looking into prisoner
deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (4) Lieutenant General James
Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, looking into Army Reserve
training procedures with special attention to military police and
military intelligence.79
The overriding question regarding the prisoner abuse echoes the
thoughts of Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a member of the Armed
Services Committee: "How could we let this prison melt down and
become the worst excuse for a military organization I've seen in my
life?" 80 To date, none of the Reports have found that there was an
74 But see Abu Ghraib Whitewash, HERALD INT. TRIBUNE, July 27, 2004, at 6
(arguing that the military investigations are whitewashes and that a congressional
inquiry is needed to learn why the abuse occurred).
75 Article 15-6 Investigation of the 8 0 0 h Military Police Brigade, May 2, 2004
[hereinafter Taguba Report].
76 Department of the Army Inspector General Detainee Operations Inspection,
July 21, 2004 [hereinafter Army IG Report].
77 Executive Summary of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib & Article 15-6
Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 2 0 5 th Military Intelligence Brigade,
August 25,2004 [hereinafter Fay Report].
78 Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations,
Aug. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Schlesinger Report].
79 See generally Dave Moniz & Donna Leinwand, Report. Poor Planning Set
Contextfor Abuse, USA TODAY August 25, 2004 at A8.
80 Mark Mazzetti, Julian E. Barnes, Edward T. Pound, David E. Kaplan
& Linda
Robinson, Inside the Iraq Prison Scandal, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 24,
2004, at 27.
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official policy-either written or oral-to torture or abuse prisoners.'
According to the Schlesinger Report, the most far reaching
investigation to date and the one which the Wall Street Journal
deemed the "definitive assessment of what went wrong,"' 82 "no
approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in
fact occurred., 83 In fact, the Schlesinger Report found: "There is no
evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or
military authorities." 84 In addition, none of the Reports cite any direct
abuse of prisoners by officers or by superiors ordering subordinates to
commit the abuses. 85 In short, the Schlesinger Report concurs with all
the Reports to date in finding that the individuals that
conducted the
86
acts.
their
for
responsible
personally
are
abuse
sadistic
Nevertheless, taking a broader examination of what happened at
Abu Ghraib, the Schlesinger Report did find fault with the senior
levels of command; there were "fundamental failures throughout all
levels of command, from the soldiers on the ground to [the United
States] Central Command and to the Pentagon",87 that set the stage for
the abuses.
The Schlesinger Report agreed with the calls for disciplinary
action in the Fay Report for a number of officers in the immediate
tactical chain of command who knew, or should have known, about

81

See, e.g., Greg Jaffe & David S. Cloud, U.S. Takes Criticismfor Handling of

Prisoners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2004, at A3 (finding that even the Fay Report,
which called for possible disciplinary action for poor leadership at the prison by
Colonel Thomas Pappas, did not hold that Pappas was directly involved with the
abuse).
82 Rumsfeld Vindication, supra note 9.
83 See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 5.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Jaffe & Cloud, supra note 81; Editorial, Responsibility Runs High at
Abu Ghraib, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEW, Aug. 30, 2004, at B4 (arguing that a
judgment on the political leadership will be heard at the presidential election on
November 2, 2004).
86 Rumsfeld Vindication, supra note 9.
87 See Dave Moniz & Donna Leinwand, Report: Poor Planning Set Context for
Abuse, USA
panel).

TODAY,

August 25, 2004, at A8 (quoting Tillie Fowler, a member of the
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the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 88 "The commanders of both brigades800 th Military Police Brigade Commander Janis Karpinski and Military
Intelligence Brigade Commander Thomas Pappas-either knew, or
should have known, abuses were taking place and taken measures to
prevent them." 89 Certainly, however, this would include not only
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski and Colonel Thomas Pappas, but
those subordinate commanders and on down the chain of command to
the battalion, company and platoon level. 90 The chaotic environment
at the prison existed in large part due to the dereliction of tactical
commanders on the ground at Abu Ghraib. 91
The Schlesinger Report and all other investigations find that the
culpability of commanders rests at the tactical level. The Schlesinger
Report found "no evidence that organizations above 8 0 0 th MP
Brigade-or the 205 MI92Brigade-level were directly involved in the
incidents at Abu Ghraib.
While all the Reports talked about a number of factors that
contributed to an atmosphere that allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib to
occur, the Schlesinger Report did the best job at providing a clear
summation. 93 These factors included:
i. A lack of planning for detainee operations-from the
Pentagon to the commanders on the ground in Iraq-and an
inability to react to the marked spike in the insurgency that
occurred in the summer of 2003. 94

88 Schlesinger Report supra note 78, at 43, 15. "The Panel expects disciplinary

action may be forthcoming." Id., at 43. "The Panel anticipates that the Chain of
Command will take additional disciplinary action as a result of the referrals of the
Jones/Fay investigation." Id., at 15.
89

Id.

90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Laura Parker, Chaotic Picture of Abu Ghraib Emerges, USA
August 9, 2004, at A6 (describing the chaotic conditions at Abu Ghraib).
Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 43.
93 See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, Chaotic Prison Always on the Brink, USA
TODAY, August 26, 2004, at A4 (describing conditions at the site as going from one
logistical crisis to another).
94 Schlesinger Report supra note 78, at 10-11.
TODAY,
92
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ii. A confusing chain of command at Abu Ghraib where a
Pappas, was placed in
military intelligence officer, Colonel
95
units.
police
military
command of
96
iii. Lack of equipment and troops at Abu Ghraib.
command to supervise
iv. A failure of the immediate chain of 97
command.
their
under
and train soldiers
Finally, the Schlesinger Report did an excellent job of placing the
problem of detainee abuse in a wider "real world" perspective. Noting
that the U.S. military has handled about 50,000 detainees from all
theaters of conflict since the start of combat operations in Afghanistan
in 2001, 98 the Schlesinger Report then compared that figure with the
number of reported allegations of abuse, including some deaths. With
around 300 cases of abuse reported, the Schlesinger Report noted that
about one-third of the allegations occurred at the "point of capture or
[at a] tactical collection point." 99 As of August 2004, about half of the
300 cases had been investigated with 66 substantiated cases.100

9'Id., at 17. "(T]he already cited leadership problems in the 8 0 0th MP Brigade,
...
were a series of tangled command relationships." Id.
96 Id., at 11. "Abu Ghraib was seriously overcrowded, under-resourced, and
under continual attack." Id.
97 Id., at 12, 17, 45. "Although its readiness was certified by the U.S. Army
Forces Command, actual deployment of the 8 0 0 th Brigade to Iraq was chaotic." Id.
at 12. "The failure to react appropriately to the October 2003 ICRC report,
following its two visits to Abu Ghraib, is indicative of the weakness of the leadership
at Abu Ghraib." Id., at 17. "The Panel finds that the weak and ineffectual leadership
of the Commanding General of the 8 0 0 h MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer
of the 20 5 th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib." Id., at 45.
98 Id., at 5.
99 Id.
1oo Id.

IDF LAW REVIEW

VOL. 2 (2005-2006)

IV. Interrogation Practices
We must and shall, consistent with applicable U.S. law, collect
intelligence that allows us to protect American citizens from further
terroristattacks.101
Alberto R. Gonzales
Since the security detainees were not entitled to prisoner of war
status, American interrogators were free to conduct interrogations so
long as such questioning was done under the parameters of
international law. In short, this meant that American interrogators
could not employ torture'
or other acts of "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,"1' ' 3 i.e., "ill-treatment" when
questioning detainees. They could, however, employ other lawful
interrogation tactics. 104
The primary responsibility for intelligence gathering in the Iraqi
War rests with the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD relies chiefly
on The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a DOD support agency
with over 7,000 military and civilian employees stationed throughout
the world. 0 5 The field manual for military interrogators is known as
Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (FM 34-52).106
In listing the 17 authorized interrogation methods, FM 34-52 clearly

101Alberto R. Gonzales, TerroristsAre Different, USA
A14.

102

TODAY,

June 10, 2004, at

United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. FAOR, 3 9 th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). [hereinafter Torture Convention].
103 Id., at Article 16.
104 See Richard Willing & John Diamond, U.S. InterrogatorsFace 'Gray Areas'
With Prisoners,USA TODAY, May 13, 2004, at A 10.
105 See Richard A. Serrano & Greg Miller, Many Attacks Foiled, U.S. Says,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2003, at A3 (addressing the nine-page affidavit filed
by Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby which disclosed more than 100 foiled attacks
against the United States).
106 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUEL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION

(1992) [hereinafter FM 34-52].
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prohibits the use of torture or07physical stress techniques (ill-treatment)
in conducting interrogations.'
The official position of the United States on the question of torture
and ill-treatment has always remained constant-the United States
does not 08
engage in torture or other ill-treatment in questioning
detainees.
a) Torture and Ill-treatment
The United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention)
is the principle international agreement governing torture and illtreatment. 09 The Torture Convention defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for
an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind when such pain or
107 Jess Bravin, InterrogationSchool Tells Army Recruits How Grilling Works.
30 Techniques in 16 Weeks, Just Short of Torture; Do They Yield Much?, WALL ST.
J., April 26, 2002, at Al (examining some of the interrogation methods taught to
students, the story covered the training given to Army interrogators at the United
States Army's interrogation school located in Fort Huachuca, Arizona).
Interrogators-the Pentagon renamed them "human intelligence
collectors" last year-are authorized not just to lie, but to prey on a
prisoner's ethnic stereotypes, sexual urges and religious prejudices, his
fear for his family's safety, or his resentment of his fellows. They'll
[Army interrogators] do just about anything short of torture, which
officials say is not taught here, to make their prisoners spill
information that could save American lives. Id.
108 Memorandum for Commander USSOUTHCOM, Subject:
CounterResistance Techniques, Jan. 15, 2003, signed by Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld.
109 Torture Convention, supra note 102.

VOL. 2 (2005-2006)

IDF LAW REVIEW

suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of ...a
public official or other person acting in a public
capacity. Itdoes not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. 110
Thus, a detainee claiming that he was tortured during an
interrogation would have to show four things: 11 (1) the interrogator
was an agent of a State, (2) the acts of the interrogator were intentional
in nature, (3) the acts of the interrogator caused severe pain or
suffering to body or mind, and (4) the acts of the interrogator were
accomplished with the intent to gain information or a confession.
Article 2 expressly excludes the notion of exceptional
circumstances to serve as a justification for torture.1 2 Equally as
important, Article 2 also recognizes that the defense of superior orders
is not a valid justification under any circumstances: "An order from a

"0 Id.,

at Article 1.
1 The United States added some minor reservations regarding specific intent
and sharpening the concept of mental suffering.
See U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings and Convention Against Torture and Other Forms
of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment II.(l)(a), 136 Cong. Rec.
S 17491-92 (1994).
[T]he United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, and
act must be specifically intended to inflict severe or mental pain or
suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental
harm caused by or resulting from: (1)the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the sense or the personality; (3) the threat of
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently
be subject to death, or severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
12 Id., at Article 2(2), "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture." Id.
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authority may not be invoked as a
superior officer or a public
113
torture."
for
justification
If the concept of torture is clear, the concept of ill-treatment is not.
Unfortunately, the Torture Convention does not define ill-treatment
and provides only the most elementary sanction to the practice which
obviously attempts to address all those illegal interrogation practices
that fall below the threshold of torture. 114 Guidance for what
constitutes ill-treatment can be found in a 1984 decision by the
European Court of Human Rights' 15 entitled, Ireland v. United

Kingdom."16

The Ireland court made factual determinations that

suspected terrorists from Northern Ireland were subjected to illtreatment and not torture under the European Convention on Human
Rights. 1 '7 Ireland held that the difference between torture and illtreatment "derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the
suffering inflicted."' ' 8 The Ireland Court weighed the use of the socalled "five techniques" 9 which were utilized by British authorities

113Id., at Article 2(3).

1 4 Id., at Article 16.
115 Check in the case

history in the European Court of Human Rights was

founded on November 1, 1998. It's charter is to enforce the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified in 1953; See
European Court of Human Rights homepage, available at http://www.echr.coe.int
(last visited May 22, 2006) [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
116 Ireland v.United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
17 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 115.
118 Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 116, (of the seventeen judges on the
panel, thirteen held that the five techniques did not constitute torture. Sixteen of the
judges held that the five techniques were "ill-treatment").
119/Id.

(1) Wall-standing: Forcing detainees to stand for some period of
hours in a stress position described as "spreadeagled against the wall,
with their fingers put high above their head against the wall, the legs
spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with
the weight of the body mainly on the fingers." Id.
(2) Hooding: Placing a dark hood over the head of the detainee and
keeping it on for prolonged periods of time except during
interrogation.
(3) Subjection to Noise: Holding detainees in rooms with continuous
loud and hissing noise.
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during or pending interrogation sessions and found that the practices
caused intense physical pain and mental suffering 12 but not of the
intensity and cruelty implied by torture-not severe pain. 121
Another primary legal source to distinguish a lawful interrogation
from one that violates international law is found in the 1999 Israeli
High Court decision entitled Public Committee Against Torture v.
State of Israel (Public Committee). 122 Apart from ruling that there
existed an absolute prohibition 23 on torture and physical abuse, 124 the
High Court determined how otherwise reasonable interrogation
practices could become illegal if taken to an extreme point of
12
intensity.
For example,
the subject of
during ona
lengthy interrogation
processdepriving
may be appropriate,
butsleep
depending

(4) Deprivation of Sleep: Depriving detainees of sleep for prolonged
periods of time.
(5) Deprivation of Food and Drink: Reducing the food and drink to
suspects pending interrogations.
120 Id., at 79-80.
121Id.,

at 80.

122 H.C.J. 5100/94, The Public Committee Against Torture v. State of Israel,
P.D. 53(4) 817 [hereinafter Public Committee]. Also see 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) for

an English text of the decision. The Court consolidated the complaints of seven
plaintiffs who alleged that the techniques employed by the GSS were illegal; For an
excellent overview of the case see Melissa L. Clark, Israel's High Court of Justice
Ruling on the General Security Service Use of "Moderate Physical Pressure": An
End of The Sanctioned Use of Torture?, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, at 164
(2000).
123 Id., The Public Committee Against Torture v. The State of Israel, at 1476.
124 Id. at 1482-1485.
[S]haking is a prohibited investigation method. It harms the suspect's
body. It violates his dignity. It is a violent method which does not
form part of a legal investigation.

The Shabach method ... is not

encompassed by the general power to interrogate there is no inherent
investigative need for seating the suspect on a chair so low and tilted
forward towards the ground, in a manner that causes him real pain and
suffering. These methods ... impinge upon the suspect's dignity, his

bodily integrity, and his basic rights in an excessive manner. They are
not to be deemed as included within the general power to conduct
interrogations.
125 Id.
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the extent of sleep deprivation could also constitute ill-treatment or

torture. 126
Apart from being bound by international law, the United States
defines torture at 18 U.S.C. § 2340 as:
[A]n act committed by a person acting under the color of
the law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or

mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
another person within
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon
127
control.
physical
or
his custody
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2340A makes it a federal offense for an
American national to either commit or attempt to commit torture
outside the United States.' 28
Furthermore, the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 now opens United States courts to civil law
damage suits by any individual "who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," violates international

126 Id. at 1484-1485. The Court recognized that interrogation for a prolonged
period of time is necessarily exhausting and an inevitable part of a normal
interrogation process. Nevertheless, the Court understood that sleep deprivation
could be the basis for complaint.
This [questioning the suspect for a prolonged period of time] is part of
the "discomfort" inherent to an interrogation. This being the case,
depriving the suspect of sleep is, in our opinion, included in the
general authority of the investigator.... The above described situation

is different from those in which sleep deprivation shifts from being a

"side effect" inherent to the interrogation, to an end in itself. If the
suspect is internationally deprived of sleep for a prolonged period of
time, for the purpose of tiring him out or "breaking" him-it shall not
fall within the scope of a fair and reasonable investigation.
127 18 U.S.C.A. §2340 (2003).
128 18 U.S.C.A. §2340A (2003). The statute states in part:

[W]hoever outside the United States Commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death, or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
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law regarding torture. 29 All American military personnel who engage
in either torture or ill-treatment are subject to prosecution under
applicable punitive articles set out in the military's Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). 30
'
Contrary to well placed concern about the meaning of the socalled "torture memos" released by the Justice department's Office of

Legal Council to the White House, the Bush administration has never
attempted to place itself above the prohibition on torture regardless of
the status of any particular detainee.13 Unfortunately, the subject
memorandums, titled "Application of Treaties and Law to al-Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees" and "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation,"
attempted to take a narrow view of the absolute prohibition on

torture. 32 As stated, there is no exception to the absolute prohibition
on torture. The United States has ratified the Torture Convention and
even passed a criminal statue to prohibit torture regardless of the
circumstances.

129 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Section 2 (2003),
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. Section 3 of the Act defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a
third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for
an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind ....
130 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1988) [hereinafter
UCMJ].

131 See,

e.g., Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Frameworkfor Use of Torture,

WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at Al (discussing the possibility that the Pentagon was
entertaining the use of torture); Christopher Cooper & Jess Bravin, White House,
Answering Critics, Releases InterrogationRecords, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2004, at
A3 (discussing the release of internal documents concerning interrogation
techniques).
132 Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June
28, 2004, at A10 (discussing the need for wise counsel to the president on the legal
issues associated with interrogation and torture).
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b) Protocol Ito the Geneva Conventions

Throughout the War on Terror, the Red Cross has regularly
criticized the United States for alleged violations of international law
by conducting interrogations of non-uniformed combatants and
terrorists taken into custody. 133 The legal basis that the Red Cross
asserts is Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949,134 which would accord prisoner of war status to these
people.135 The problem with this charge is that the United States has
never ratified Protocol 1.136 On the contrary, the United States
specifically rejected Protocol I for the very reason that it bestowed a
legal status on non-uniformed combatants.' 37 Thus, the idea that
Protocol I is binding on the United States as a principal of "customary
international law, ' 38 is correct only in part. 139 The United States is
133See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 86. "[T]he ICRC sent a report
to

the State Department and the Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2003 citing
lack of compliance with Protocol I."
134 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). Commonly known as Protocol
I, this instrument seeks to extend coverage of non-international conflicts in which
"persons are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their rights to self-determination."
135
Id.
136 See Abraham Sofaer, Agora. The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims (Cont.), 82 A.J.I.L. 784
(1988).
137
id.

138

A State may express its consent to be bound to a particular treaty in a number

of fashions. Even absent consent, however, a State may be bound to a treaty under
the concept of customary international law-when a standard of law has achieved
widespread acceptance in the international community. The derivation of customary
principles of international law comes from observing past uniformities among
nations. Evidence of customary international law may be found in judicial decisions,
the writings of noted jurists, and other documentary material related to the practice
of States.
139 See Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct
of
Aerial Precision Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 458 (2004) (Stating
"Protocol I, although never ratified by the United States, contains several provisions.
•. that have been generally adopted by the U.S. military as non-binding acceptable
practice.")
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not bound by Protocol I in this regard and is perfectly within its legal
rights to interrogate non-uniformed combatants or terrorists; these
individuals are not entitled to the protections given to prisoners of war.
The Red Cross is unquestionably a valuable early warning system for
any democracy that wants to respect the rule of law, but its credibility
is weakened each time it uses the guise of Protocol I to criticize the
United States.
c) Stress andDuress
One outcome of the Abu Ghraib abuse story was the June 2004
release of a "10-centimetre pile of [classified] internal memos and
documents" 140 from senior policy makers in the Bush administration
detailing the approved interrogation tactics for conducting
interrogations of uncooperative detainees. 14 1 As early as 2002, the
most extreme application of the supposed techniques had come to be
called "stress and duress" 1 42 and prior to the June 2004 release of the
memorandums, the public was left to wonder whether the techniques
were lawful or actually involved torture or illegal abuse.
The reluctance to release the exact interrogation techniques
centered on the fear that the release of such information would allow
enemy forces to develop counter-intelligence techniques to frustrate
efforts to get meaningful intelligence. Consequently, U.S. officials
remained silent about the techniques, telling the public that its agents
were employing the full range of robust interrogation tactics to include
offering various incentives such as money, or engaging in trickery. 43
140

Paul Koring, U.S. Scrambles to Douse Fire Over Treatment of Prisoners,

AND MAIL, June 24 2004, at A 17.
141 Id.
142 See Barton Gellman & Dana

GLOBE

Priest, U.S. Decries Abuse But Defends

Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used On Terrorism Suspects Held in
Secret Overseas Facilities,WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al. (Stress and duress is
described as an interrogational technique which include keeping prisoners standing
or kneeling for hours while hooded or wearing spray-painted goggles, holding them
in "awkward, painful positions" and depriving them of sleep with a 24-hour
bombardment of lights).
143 See Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN), Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, submitted in the matter of Padilla v. Bush 233
F.Supp.2d 564 (2002) [hereinafter Jacoby Declaration].

The Abu Ghraib Story

Jeffrey F. Addicott

With the release of the June 2004 memorandums, it is now clearat least on paper-that the United States did not engage in a systemic
command directed interrogation regime that violates international law.
In tandem with the June 2004 document release, President Bush
declared: "Look, let me make very clear the position of my
government and our country. We do not condone torture. I have
never ordered torture. The values of this country are such that torture
is not a part of our soul and being."1 44 A review of the memorandums
show that the most severe technique that was approved by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the use of "mild, non-injurious
physical contact-poking, grabbing, lightly shoving" against selected
high-value 5 detainees, like one Guantanamo detainee named al4
Khatani. 1
The memorandums show that on December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld
authorized a series of interrogation techniques that could be used on
detainees at Guantanamo Bay only, known as Category I, Category II,
and Category III.146 Category I techniques allowed for interrogators to
do such things as lie to detainees about their surroundings as well as
other facts and to yell at them during questioning sessions. Category
II included more stress related techniques which included holding
them in isolation cells for up to thirty days, taking away comfort items
(toothpaste, reading materials, etc.), making the detainee shave their
beards, playing on a detainee's phobia (e.g., the use of barking dogs),
and forcing a detainee to stand for four hours at a time. Category III
approval was for only one technique which allowed interrogators to
employ "mild, noninjurious physical contact" (grabbing or
47
pushing). 1
Six weeks later, on January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded the
approval of the use of all Category II techniques and the one Category

144

Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed,

Justice Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004,
at Al.
145 Koring, supra note 140.
146 For an excellent synopsis of the memorandums see Richard A. Serrano &
Richard B. Schmitt, Files Show Bush Team Torn Over POW Rules, L.A. TIMES, June
23, 2004,
at Al.
14 7
id.
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III technique.

14 8

In

doing so,

Rumsfeld

ordered:

"In

all

interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment of detainees,
regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed."' 149 In
April 2003, Rumsfeld issued a new set of directives that applied only
to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 150 This memorandum sets
out dozens of interrogation techniques that essentially track FM 34-52

guidelines. 151
In the Iraqi campaign, the administration has consistently held the
position that the Geneva Conventions will apply to the detainees. As
Daniel J. Bell'Orto, the principal deputy Defense general counsel
related-it is "all Geneva, all the time." 152 In Iraq, the then head of
U.S. forces, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, issued a one-page
directive in October 2003, titled "Interrogation Rules of Engagement,"
which would be applicable to non-POWs.' 53 This directive allowed
for practices, vetted by Army lawyers as lawful under the Fourth

Geneva Convention and Common Article 3 that included silence,
repetition of questioning, emotional love/hate techniques, and the use

of fear (where the interrogator behaves
in a heavy overpowering
154
things).
throwing
or
yelling
manner by
148

Memorandum for Commander USSOUTHCOM, supra note 108.
My December 2, 2002 approval of the use of all Category II techniques
and one Category III technique during interrogations at Guantanamo is
hereby rescinded. Should you determine that particular techniques in
either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you
should forward that request to me. Such a request should include a
thorough justification for the employment of those techniques and a
detailed plan for the use of such techniques. Id.

149

Id.

Memorandum for Commander USSOUTHCOM, Subject: Counter-Resistance
Techniques in the War on Terrorism, Apr. 16, 2003, signed by Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld.
151 See supra note 106.
152 Richard A. Serrano & Richard B. Schmitt, Files Show Bush Team Torn Over
150

POWRules, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at Al.
153 For an excellent synopsis of the memorandum see Carla Anne Robbins,
Greg
Jaffe, & David S. Cloud, InterrogationRules Were Issued before Iraq Abuses, WALL

ST. J., May 13, 2004, at Al.
154 Id.
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V. I Was Only Following Orders
55

I don't know how the hell these people got into our Army. 1

Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
With the conviction of PFC England in September 2005, the ninth
and last member of the 372 nd Army Reserve Company, all those
accused in the prisoner abuse cases have been punished. In the early
period of the cases, however, an often heard contention by some of the
156
defense counsels was that their clients were "only following orders"'
from superiors and were therefore not criminally responsible for the
individual acts of abuse. The government consistently rejected this
argument, arguing instead that the behavior was the work of a "band of
rogue soldiers who on their own perpetrated the abuse.' 57 In the end,
only England and Graner plead not guilty and raised the defense of
superior orders. The defense was rejected by the panel and both were
convicted.
The question of "why" Abu Ghraib happened has been explored in
some detail in the subsequent Reports inter ail. The deficiencies
addressed, particularly in the Schlesinger Report, ranged from a lack
of training provided to the soldiers to a lack of supervision by the
chain of command. 58 Such deficiencies may excuse minor or
technical breaches of the law, but not the types of malum in se sadism
that was committed by the nine reservists. Echoing the Peers
155

Id.

156 See, e.g., Farnaz Fassihi, Top U.S. Officers Must Testify in Abuse Trial,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2004, at A17 (defense lawyers have argued that their clients

were "following daily orders form military intelligence to 'soften up and loosen up'
the detainees"); Noelle Knox, Higher-ups at Abu Ghraib Could Face Abuse
Charges, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2004, at A8 (defense attorney's want to show that
the military police were acting under orders); Dave Moniz & Dennis Cauchon,
Accused GIs Build Defense, USA TODAY, May 13, 2004 at IA (lawyers for two of
the accused contend that their clients were ordered to take the photographs by
unidentified intelligence personnel).
157 Laura Parker, Ex-comrade: England Tormented Iraqis, USA TODAY, August
31, 2004, at A 13.
158 See supra Part Ill.

IDF LAW REVIEW

VOL. 2 (2005-2006)

Commission, 159 which investigated the causes for the My Lai
massacre in the Viet Nam War where U.S. troops murdered over 300
civilians, 160 the Schlesinger Report found that the actions of the seven
reservists involved behavior that was "aberrant,"' 16' and "fostered by
the predilections of the noncommissioned officers in charge" on the
night shift at Cell Block 1 (where most of the abuse took place)."
Although the Schlesinger Report stressed also that the abuses could
' 62
"have been avoided with proper training, leadership, and oversight."'
"Had the noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the
day shift, these acts, which one participant described as 'just for the
fun of it,' would not have taken place."'' 63 Indeed, the photographs
reflect a depravity that certainly dwells independently of any of the
noted deficiencies any of the Reports. In short, it is patently obvious
that these reservists found themselves operating in an environment
where there was little if any supervision and hence no deterrence to the
overt expression of their criminal propensities.
Regardless if the crime that a soldier is accused of is classified as a
"war crime"' 164 or not, it is the policy of the United States that all
soldiers are prosecuted for such crimes under the substantive
provisions of the UCMJ. According to the Army's field manual on the
law of land warfare, FM 27-10, "the term 'war crime' is the technical
expression for a violation of the law of war by any person or persons,
military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war
crime. ' 65 In addition, the acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib may even

159 WILLIAM R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY (1979). The Secretary of the Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Army issued a joint directive to Lieutenant General
William R. Peers to explore the original Army investigations into what had occurred
on March 16, 1968, in Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.
160 Id., at 230. The Peers Commission noted that "there were some things a
soldier did not have to be told were wrong-such as rounding up women and
children and then mowing them down, shooting babies out of mother's arms, and
raping." Id.
161Schlesinger Report supra note 78, at 13.
162 Id.
163 id.

164 DEPARTMENT
WARFARE,
165 Id.

OF ARMY,

FIELD MANUAL

27-10,

para. 499 (July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].

THE LAW

OF LAND

The Abu Ghraib Story

constitute "grave breaches"

Jeffrey F. Addicott

166

of the Geneva Conventions (as opposed

breaches" 1 67 )

to "simple
if the abuse is deemed to be an act of willful
"torture or inhuman treatment" 16 8 against persons protected by the
Geneva Conventions.
The hard issue is not in how to deal with those who violate the law
in their individual capacities-these individuals are punished by courts
martial under the UCMJ. The real difficulty is presented when a
subordinate claims that they were following the orders of a superior.
Does such a claim offer a valid defense?
To analyze this matter one must begin with the premise that all
soldiers are expected to obey "lawful orders" ' 69 and can be punished
under the UCMJ if they do not.17 0 This is as true in peace time as in
time of war, although FM 27-10171 does recognize that "in conditions

of war discipline," 172 that soldiers cannot be expected to "weigh
scrupulously the legal merits of the orders received."' 173 Article 92 of
the UCMJ states that:
Any person subject to this chapter who-(1) violates or
fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2)
having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a
member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to
object, fails to obey that order; or (3) is derelict in the
performance of his duties shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct (emphasis added J.A.). 174
The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) does recognize that an act
performed in obedience to a lawful order is justified and serves as a
166 Id.at para. 502.
167 Id.at para. 504.

168 id.
169MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (1998), PART I1,
RULES FOR

COURTS-MARTIAL, 916(c) (discussing justification and unlawful orders) [hereinafter
RCM].
'70 UCMJ, supra note 130, at Article 92.
171 FM 27-10, supra note 164.
172id.
173id.
174 UCMJ, supra note 130, at Article 92.
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valid defense to any charges associated with that conduct. 175

"A

death, injury, or other act caused or done in the proper performance of
a legal duty is justified and not unlawful."' 176 In turn, an act performed
in obedience to an unlawful order may be excused under certain
conditions. 177 Those conditions are set out in two parts. The first
prong is a subjective analysis of what the accused knew about the
order. If the accused knew the order to be unlawful he may not assert
the defense that he was following orders. If the accused did not know
that the order was unlawful, then the second part of the analysis turns
on an objective test-"person of ordinary sense and understanding
would have known it to be unlawful."' 7 8 In a rather short statement the
MCM provides the following: "It is a defense to any offense that the
accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the
orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense
and understanding
179
would have known the orders to be unlawful.'

FM 27-10 provides additional guidance on the question of whether
a superior order can serve as a defense to a crime. 18 The fact that a
crime has been committed "pursuant to an order of a superior
authority, whether military or civilian, does not ...
constitute a defense
...
unless he [the accused] did not know and could not reasonably have

been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful."' 81
In considering the question whether a superior order
constitutes a valid defense, the court shall take into
consideration the fact that obedience to lawful military
orders is the duty of every member of the armed forces;
that the latter cannot be expected, in conditions of war
discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the
orders received; that certain rules of warfare may be
controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a
war crime may be done in obedience to orders
"7

RCM 916(d), supra note 169.

176 Id., at 916(c).

17 Id., at 916(d).
178 Id., at 916(d) (this remark is under the Discussion section).
1791Id., at 916(d).
180 FM 27-10, supra note 164, at para. 509.
181Id., at para. 509(a).
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conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same time it
must be borne in mind that members of the armed
forces are bound to obey only lawful orders."'
The effort to raise the defense of superior orders for those charged
with the Abu Ghraib abuses will invariably prove futile under the facts
of the case. Even if a defendant can identify a superior who gave them
the order to conduct the abuses, which no one has yet to do, 183 the
accused would have to pass the two-tier test set out above. Not only
would the accused have to show that he or she subjectively thought
that the order was lawful but that a reasonable person would have
believed the order to be lawful. If the court finds that the accused did
not subjectively believe that the order was unlawful, then the inquiry
would shift to what a reasonable person would have thought.
Although the objective tier of the test draws on the reasonable man
standard, FM 27-10 views the matter as a reasonable man under the
stresses present in that particular war time environment. 184
For the Abu Ghraib defendants, the acts depicted in the
photographs were so offensive that the defense of superior orders
offered nothing but an empty well. According to the Schlesinger
Report: "The pictured abuses, unacceptable even in wartime, were not
part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at
,,186
intelligence targets.' ' 85 "They represent deviant behavior
They were "acts of brutality and purposeless sadism. ' 8 7 In fact,
Schlesinger related in a news conference that the "sadism on the night
shift ... was kind of 'Animal House' on the night shift."' 188

Id., at para. 509(b).
See MSNBC interview of Jeffrey Addicott by Randy Myer, Aug. 3, 2004
(Addicott responded to the contention that PFC England asserted that a superior had
given her orders to conduct the abuse by saying that the superior who gave those
orders should be prosecuted along with PFC England).
184 FM 27-10, supra note 165, at para. 509(b).
185 See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 5.
182
183

186

Id.

Id.
188 CNN Report: Abu Ghraib was 'Animal House' at Night, aired 25-8-04)
187

available at http://www.cnn.com (last viewed May 22, 2006).

VOL. 2 (2005-2006)

IDF LAW REVIEW

VI. Failure of Leadership
The aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell Block 1 at Abu
Ghraib would have been avoided with proper training,leadership and
oversight.189
Schlesinger Report
Apart from the issue of individual responsibility the factor that
weighed the heaviest in explaining the abuses at Abu Ghraib was
clearly the total break down in the immediate chain of command.
While the Schlesinger Report provides some blame to all levels of
command, it is certain that a key causative factor was the failure at the
Brigade-both the military police brigade and the military intelligence
brigade. This dereliction in leadership extended to the subordinate
officers in the command and the senior non-commissioned officers as
well. These individuals are certainly responsible for what occurred in
the light of culpability by omission; at a minimum, they were guilty of
dereliction of duty. 190
The primary responsibility for ensuring
adherence to the law rests in the officer corps. As noted, the
Schlesinger Report followed suit with all the Reports and found that
there was a "failure of military leadership and discipline.", 91
Understanding the stresses of combat and the fact that the soldiers
involved in the abuse at Abu Ghraib were untested reservists, the
leadership should have taken greater precautions to ensure that a
strong and dedicated chain of command was in charge to "inspect what
was expected." Accordingly, the officer corps must be filled with only
the finest available men and women; only officers of the highest moral
caliber and military skill should be assigned the responsibility of
command. In commenting on leadership skills for combat officers,
World War II General George S. Patton, Jr. correctly stated: "If you do

189

Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 13.

190 UCMJ, supra note 130, at art. 92.
19' See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 5.
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not enforce 92 and maintain discipline, you [officers] are potential
murderers." 1
In particular, it is well known that without proper supervision, the
stresses associated with guarding prisoners may have a tendency to
promote unlawful behavior amongst the guards. 193 In the Abu Ghraib
incident it is apparent that the immediate chain of command was
194
totally inept and provided the atmosphere for the criminal conduct
to occur on the night shift at Tier 1. But can these commanders bear a
greater culpability than dereliction of duty? Might they not be charged
with the criminal conduct of their soldiers?
Under the concept of command responsibility, a commander can be
charged with the illegal acts committed by a subordinate if the
commander ordered the crimes committed. 195 This occurs when the
"acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an order of the
commander concerned."' 96
In addition, a commander is also
responsible if he has direct knowledge that a soldier is committing a
crime and he fails to "take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure

192

PETER PETER B. WILLIAMSON, PATTON'S PRINCIPLES: A HANDBOOK FOR

MANAGERS WHO MEAN IT 35 (1979).
19'See, e.g., Phillip G. Zimbardo, Power Turns Good Soldiers Into Bad Apples,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2004, at D11; Rick Hampson, Abuse Less Shocking in Light
of History, USA TODAY, May 13, at Al (both articles discuss Professor Zimbardo's
psychological study where students who were playing unsupervised guards in a prison
would abuse the detainees).

Behavior is primarily controlled by the individual's volition. In turn, the act of
choosing to commit a crime is often related to a crude cost benefit analysis. Obviously,
194

crime is more likely to occur in an environment where the likelihood of punishment is
minimal. For an excellent discussion on how the criminal mind functions, see DR.
STANTON E. SAMENOW, JR., INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 6 (1984).
Criminals cause crime-not bad neighborhoods, inadequate parents,
television, schools, drugs, or unemployment. Crime resides in the minds
of human beings and is not caused by social conditions. Once we as a
society recognize this simple fact, we shall take measures radically
different from current ones. To be sure, we shall continue to remedy
intolerable social conditions for this is worthwhile in and of itself. But
we shall not expect criminals to change because of such efforts. Id.
195FM 27-10, supra note 165, at para. 501.
196 Id.
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[sic] compliance with the law ...or to punish violators thereof."1 97 In

the United States, this standard of command responsibility is called the
Medina Standard, so named for Captain Ernest Medina who was
charged with murder under the concept of command responsibility for
the massacre of civilians at My Lai, but was acquitted of criminal
charges. 198
A second standard for command responsibility, that was first
recognized by the United States, is the so-called Yamashita Standard,
or the "should have known" standard. 199 The Yamashita Standard is
named for the World War II Japanese general, Tomoyuki Yamashita,
who was tried before a post-war military commission for war crimes
committed by Japanese sailors under his command. The primary
charge against Yamashita revolved around the 20,000 Japanese sailors
who went on a murder and rape rampage in Manila near the end of the
war. Although the U.S. military prosecutors were unable to prove that
Yamashita directly ordered the crimes, or even knew about them, he
was convicted under a "should have known standard."
197

Id.

198 See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The TwentyFifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153
(1993).
199 See LAWRANCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 165-67 (1981); See also
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome
Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited
May 22, 2006). See also 37 I.L.M. 999, 1017, Article 28:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case
may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly
over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. (emphasis added J.A.).
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This far reaching standard of indirect responsibility is spelled out
in FM 27-10: "The commander is also responsible if he has actual
knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by
him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he
fails (emphasis added)" 200 to stop them. Accordingly, if, through
normal events, the commander should have known of the crimes and
did nothing to stop them, he is guilty of the actions of his soldiers.
Following the pattern of the Yamashita case the should have known
standard applies only when the crimes are associated with a
widespread pattern of abuse over a prolonged period of time. In such a
scenario, the commander is presumed to either have knowledge of the
crime or to have abandoned his command. 20 '
If the tactical chain of command at Abu Ghraib is charged with the
crimes of the seven reserve enlisted personnel, the government would
have to argue the Yamashita Standard-no review of the abuse scandal
has found evidence of Medina Standard activity. This may prove
somewhat difficult to do since the pattern of abuse seemed to be
limited to events that took place primarily during the nightshift at Tier
I of the prison during the period of October to December 2003.202
Nevertheless, it is clearly not enough to issue administrative
reprimands to the many officers and senior enlisted personnel in the
tactical chain of command who directly contributed to the devastating
institutional failures that allowed the abuses to occur.

VII. Conclusion
The vast majority of detainees in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and
Iraq were treated appropriately, and the great bulk of detention
operations were conducted in compliance with U.S. policy and
203
directives.
Schlesinger Report
FM 27-10, supra note 165, at 501.
See Taylor, supra note 199.
202 See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 5.
2 03
Id., at 18.
200
201
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At the end of the day, it seems improbable that the United States
military engaged in command directed torture or ill-treatment at Abu
Ghraib, particularly when it was the military that self-reported to the
media the fact that individual soldiers were being investigated and
punished in accordance with the rule of law for wartime abuses at the
prison. Clearly, the best indicator that the senior leadership is not
culpable is found in its continuing commitment to criminally
investigate and prosecute those soldiers accused of committing
detainee abuses. Numerous soldiers have already been prosecuted and
sentenced for their crimes, and criminal trials will continue for others.
When one considers that the number of detainees in the War on
Terror-including Afghanistan, Iraq and other operations-is about
50,000, 2o4 it is unrealistic to expect that abuses will not occur.
Violations of rules occur in every human endeavor, to include war. In
an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Mr. James Schlesinger
correctly noted that the "behavior of our troops is so much better than
'2°5 The so-called "bad apple" syndrome 206 is
it was in World War II.
in fact the primary causative issue at Abu Ghraib-a handful of
closely knit reserve personnel engaged in acts of sadism as they
worked the night shift from October to December of 2003.
It is equally true that the Abu Ghraib story has been devastating to
the United States. While each and every case of abuse is repulsive to
American standards of decency and justice, the terrorists have
certainly become "media-savvy" in their quest to parlay these
individual cases into marketable propaganda.20 7 For example, many
nations that are opposed to the United States are quick to exploit the
individual cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib by painting the entire conduct
of all American soldiers as immoral and illegal.20 8

204

Id. at 5.

205

Rumsfeld Vindication, supra note 9.
See, e.g., How Innocent Iraqis Came to be Abused as Terrorists, USA

206

TODAY, June 10, 2004, at A 14 (the editorial doubts the White House contention that
the abuse was primarily the result of a few bad apples).
207 Brian Michael Jenkins, World Becomes the Hostage of Media-Savvy

Terrorists, USA TODAY August 23, 2004, at All (describing how terrorists use the
media to attack attention).
208 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Of course, Americans do not need to be told that the abuses are
beyond the pale of conduct expected of its military. A CNN Gallup
poll taken in May 2004, showed that three in four Americans agreed
that the abuses at Abu Ghraib could not be justified.209
The Investigative Reports have done a great service to the
American people and the world by dispelling the shrill cries of those
who blame a secret Pentagon "culture of permissiveness," 2 1° for the
abuses at Abu Ghraib.
While the Schlesinger Report found
institutional and even personal responsibility in the tactical chain of
command for allowing conditions for abuse to occur at Abu Ghraib,
the Report specifically found that "[n]o approved procedures called for
or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no
evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or
military authorities." 21 1 The Reports exonerate the military from any
charges of a systemic use of abuse to gain intelligence, although it is
certain that some military intelligence soldiers will face charges for
their own acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib should not have happened. The damage
to American credibility and the War on Terror is incalculable and the
world is now watching to see how the United States deals with the
matter. In the long run, the manner that the military deals with Abu
Ghraib will speak volumes to the world about the true character of the
United States and its military. To its great credit the senior military
leadership certainly learned the lessons of My Lai. Understanding that
the best approach to dealing with war crimes is to act with alacrity and
transparency, the tragedy at Abu Ghraib by a few has been thoroughly
investigated and justice is being handed out to the perpetrators and, as
the process moves forward, it is hopeful that the sword of justice will
turn to those in the tactical chain of command.

209 Jill Lawrence, Abu Ghraib Probes Shift Public Focus, USA TODAY, August
25, 2004, at A7.
210 Rumsfeld Vindication, supra note 9.
211 See Schlesinger Report, supra note 78, at 5.
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